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This paper describes a series of algorithms that are used to compute optimal pol-
icy under full and imperfect information. Firstly we describe how to obtain linear
quadratic (LQ) approximations to a nonlinear optimal policy problem. We develop
novel algorithms that are required as a result of having agents with forward-looking
expectations, that go beyond the scope of those that are used when all equations are
backward-looking; these are utilised to generate impulse response functions and second
moments for the case of imperfect information. We describe algorithms for reducing
a system to minimal form that are based on conventional approaches, and that are
necessary to ensure that a solution for fully optimal policy can be computed. Finally
we outline a computational algorithm that is used to generate solutions when there is
a zero lower bound constraint for the nominal interest rate.Contents
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01 Introduction
A Linear-Quadratic (LQ) approach to nonlinear dynamic optimization problems in macroe-
conomics is widely used for a number of reasons. First, for LQ problems the characteri-
zation of time-consistent and commitment equilibria for a single policy maker, and even
more so for many interacting policymakers, are well understood. Second, the certainty
equivalence property results in optimal rules that are robust in the sense that they are
independent of the variance-covariance matrix of additive disturbances. Third, policy can
be decomposed into deterministic and stochastic components. This is a very convenient
property since it enables the stochastic stabilization component to be pursued using sim-
ple Taylor-type feedback rules rather than the exceedingly complex optimal counterpart.
Fourth, in an imperfect information context the conditional welfare loss (in deviation
form about the deterministic steady state) conveniently decomposes into a deterministic
component and two stochastic components one of which describes the eﬀect of imperfect
information. Finally for suﬃciently simple models, LQ approximation allows analytical
rather than numerical solution.
The solution to linear rational expectations models goes back to Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) and has since been generalized in various dimensions by Pearlman et al. (1986),
Klein (2000) and Sims (2003). The early literature on optimal policy with commitment
developed LQ inﬁnite time horizon control theory for engineering, non-forward-looking
models into a rational expectations (RE) forward-looking context (Driﬃll (1982), Calvo
(1978)), Miller and Salmon (1985), Levine and Currie (1987)).
In a stochastic environment the feedback representation of policy is crucial. For the
standard inﬁnite time horizon LQ engineering problem, optimal policy can be represented
as a linear time-invariant feedback rule on the state variables; but this is no longer the
case when RE are introduced. Then as is shown in Levine and Currie (1987) the optimal
policy can only be implemented as a form of integral control. The added complexity of
such a rule adds force to the case for designing policy in the form of simple optimized,
but sub-optimal rules. The normative case for such rules was ﬁrst put forward by Vines
et al. (1983), Levine and Currie (1985), Currie and Levine (1985) and Currie and Levine
(1993). This early literature considered both monetary and ﬁscal policy and in the case of
Vines et al. (1983) incomes and exchange rate targeting policies. The positive case for a
particular form of monetary policy interest rate rule feeding back on current inﬂation the
output gap was advocated by Taylor (1999), so simple ‘Maciejowski-Meade-Vines-Currie-
Levine Rules’ eventually became known as ‘Taylor Rules’. More recently, in the context
of DSGE models, we have seen a renewed interest in simple rules in general (referred to
by Woodford (2003) as ‘explicit instrument rules’) and interest rate rules in particular.
Following the pioneering contributions of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983), the credibility problem associated with monetary policy has stimulated a
1huge academic literature that has been inﬂuential with policymakers. The central mes-
sage underlying these contributions is the existence of signiﬁcant macroeconomic gains, in
some sense, from ‘enhancing credibility’ through formal commitment to a policy rule or
through institutional arrangements for central banks such as independence, transparency,
and forward-looking inﬂation targets, that achieve the same outcome. The technical rea-
son for this result is that optimal policy formulated by Pontryagin’s maximum principle is
time-inconsistent - the simple passage of time, even in a deterministic environment, leads
to an incentive to re-optimize and renege on the initial optimal plan. Appreciation of this
problem has motivated the examination of policies that are optimal within the constraint
of being time consistent (Levine and Currie (1985), Miller and Salmon (1985), Currie and
Levine (1987), Cohen and Michel (1988) and S¨ oderlind (1999) )
Comparing optimal policy with and without commitment enables us then to quan-
tify the stabilization gains from commitment. A number of papers have addressed this
question (see, for example, Vestin (2001), Ehrmann and Smets (2003), McCallum and
Nelson (2004), and Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2006)), but only in the context of economet-
ric models without micro-foundations and using an ad hoc loss function, or both, or for
rudimentary New Keynesian models. The credibility issue only arises because the deci-
sions of consumers and ﬁrms are forward looking and depends on expectations of future
policy. In the earlier generation of econometric models lacking micro-foundations, many
aspects of such forward-looking behaviour were lacking and therefore important sources of
time-inconsistency were missing. Although for simple New Keynesian models a quadratic
approximation of the representative consumer’s utility coincides with the standard ad hoc
loss that penalizes variances of the output gap and inﬂation, in more developed DSGE
models this is far from the case. By utilizing an inﬂuential empirical micro-founded DSGE
model, the euro area model of Smets and Wouters (2003), Levine et al. (2008b) use a
quadratic approximation of the representative household’s utility as the welfare criterion,
toe remedy these deﬁciencies of earlier estimates of commitment gains.
An further important consideration when addressing the gains from commitment, and
missing from these earlier studies, is the existence of a nominal interest rate zero lower
bound. A number of papers have studied optimal commitment policy with this constraint
(for example, Coenen and Wieland (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Woodford
(2003), chapter 6). In an important contribution to the credibility literature, Adam and
Billi (2007) show that ignoring the zero lower bound constraint for the setting of the
nominal interest rate can result in considerably underestimating the stabilization gain
from commitment. The reason for this is that under discretion the monetary authority
cannot make credible promises about future policy. For a given setting of future interest
rates the volatility of inﬂation is driven up by the expectations of the private sector that
the monetary authority will re-optimize in the future. This means that to achieve a given
low volatility of inﬂation the lower bound is reached more often under discretion than
2under commitment. All these authors study a simple New Keynesaian and are able to
employ non-linear techniques. In a more developed model such as Smets and Wouters
(2003), Levine et al. (2008b) adopt the more tractable linear-quadratic (LQ) framework
reviewed above.
Further work on policy design takes LQ approximation as given and addresses issues
of robustness or the zero lower bound constraint for interest rates, and this is a further
Dynare theme that will be addressed by the authors in the future.
Section 2 focuses on the quadratic approximation to the welfare function via the
quadratic expansion of the Lagrangian about the long-run optimum, while Section 3 pro-
vides a detailed account of the linear approximation to the constraints. Sections 4 and
5 describe how this is used to generate impulse response functions and second moments
when agents have imperfect information. Section 6 describes how the likelihood function
is computed under symmetric imperfect information between agents and econometrician.
Section 7 shows how to obtain a reduced form of the state space which is controllable
and observable - both essential for computational purposes. Section 8 discusses issues of
optimal policy when the nominal interest rate is constrained not to be below zero with a
given (small) probability; we outline an algorithm which has good convergence properties
in practice. Section 9 concludes.
2 The LQ Approximation
But what is the correct procedure for replacing a stochastic nonlinear optimization prob-
lem with a LQ approximation? As pointed out by Judd (1998), some common methods
employed by economists have produced poor approximations which fail to consistently
incorporate all relevant second-order terms and thus open up the possibility of spurious
results. These pitfalls are also very neatly exposed in Kim and Kim (2003) and Kim and
Kim (2006).
Judd (1998), pages 507-509, draws attention to a general Hamiltonian framework for
approximating a nonlinear problem by an LQ one due to Magill (1977a), who appears
to be the ﬁrst to have applied it in the economics literature, albeit in a continuous-time
framework.1 This paper is the precursor to a recent literature led by Michael Woodford
that considers an LQ approximation to the Ramsey problem in the context of DSGE
models.2 Levine et al. (2008a) also apply the Hamiltonian approach to nonlinear prob-
1See also, Magill (1977b).
2See Woodford (2003), Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005), Altissimo et al. (2005), Benigno and
Woodford (2008) for one-country models and Benigno and Benigno (2006) for a two-country generalization.
The large distortions’ case of Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Benigno (2006) uses the
method of undetermined coeﬃcients, but their more recent work uses what amounts to the Hamiltonian
approach of Magill which involves less algebraic manipulation and provides a more convenient algorithm
suitable for numerical computation.
3lems in a two-country context to obtain an LQ approximation. It should be noted that
the Judd second-order perturbation and Hamiltonian approaches generate the same LQ
approximation.
Both Benigno and Woodford (2008) and Levine et al. (2008a) develop the Magill frame-
work in presenting a discrete-time version of his results generalized to rational expectations
models with forward-looking variables. These results include second-order necessary con-
ditions for non-concave intertemporal problems which are rarely discussed in the literature
and have not been published anywhere for forward-looking systems. Levine et al. (2008a)
explain how these conditions relate to the non-optimality of zero inﬂation for certain pa-
rameter combinations in a New Keynesian setting.
The underlying idea behind LQ approximation is that it is an approximation that is
valid in the vicinity of the steady state of the optimal solution to the policy problem. This
poses no problems for a purely backward-looking system, but is potentially controversial
in economics, given that some behaviour is forward-looking. It would seem therefore
that there is potentially one steady state that is a solution to the policy problem when
the policymaker can commit, and another when the policymaker cannot. In the ﬁrst
case, the steady state may be solved from the steady state of the ﬁrst-order conditions
for an optimum; this is identical to the case when all forward-looking expectations are
treated as though they were dependent on the other variables in the equations in which
they appear, so that in eﬀect they are backward-looking3. In the second case, the time-
consistent solution must be Markov perfect, which requires that forward expectations be
expressed in terms of variables which are backward looking; the optimal solution must
then be consistent with this assumed behaviour. However, apart from LQ problems there
is no known way to calculate the solutions to these time-consistent problems in which the
policymaker cannot commit. In addition there is the issue of whether there are further
possible steady states which take account of the policymaker merely applying an optimal
simple (e.g. Taylor-type monetary) rule.
The literature however appears to have converged to a view that most policymakers
have the ability to commit to a long-run value of the policy variable, but there is no
guarantee that they have the ability or institutional power to pre-commit to responses
to shocks. It follows that one can use an LQ approximation derived from perturbations
about the deterministic long run of the fully optimal (pre-commitment) solution, which
yields a linear approximation to the dynamics and the quadratic approximation to the
welfare. This in turn can be applied to solve the response to shocks under any further
behavioural assumption - pre-commitment, time consistency or commitment to simple
rules. A variation on the optimal rule is the timeless approach due to Woodford (1999),
which has been shown by Blake and Kirsanova (2004) to be sometimes inferior to time-
3Of course the dynamic behaviour is diﬀerent from the forward-looking case, as the initial conditions
in the latter case can jump.
4consistent policy and by Ellison et al. (2009) to suﬀer from lack of transparency.
A useful property of the LQ approximation is that when it is extended to include
shocks as well, then the quadratic approximation of the welfare can be expressed in terms
of targets or ‘bliss points’ for linear combinations of macroeconomic variables. Such a
property ﬁts in with the notion of targeting rules proposed by Svensson (2003, 2005).
For two decades or more many macroeconomists ’forgot’ the work of Magill (1977a),
and proceeded by linearizing the dynamics and taking quadratic approximations of the
welfare function, which leads to wrong results. For a number of years from about 2000-
2006, the LQ approximation to the Ramsey problem was analysed for the ‘eﬃcient case’
(where subsidies eliminate distortions in the steady state due typically to price or wage
frictions) and the ‘small distortions case’ where such subsidies are not available, but for
which the steady state was similar to that of eﬃciency. However with the resurrection
of the Hamiltonian approach the so-called ’large distortions’ or LQ approach is becoming
the norm.
The problem is to maximize E0
∑
βtu(Yt,Wt) such that
Etg(Yt,Yt+1,Wt,εt) = 0 h(Yt,Yt−1,Wt,εt) = 0 (1)
We write the problem in this way so that, for convenience, there are no 2nd order deriva-
tives in Yt+1 and Yt−1; thus the main constraint is that there are no nonlinear interactions
between Yt+1 and Yt−1. If there are, then just deﬁne a new set of required variables
Y Lit = Yi;t−1, and append the latter equations to h( , ) and the new variables to Yt.
Write the Lagrangian as
∑
βt[u(Yt,Wt) + λTf(Yt,Yt+1,Yt−1,Wt,εt)] (2)
where fT = [gT hT]. First-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂Wt
= u2 + λTf4(Yt,Yt+1,Yt−1,Wt,εt) (3)
∂L
∂Yt





Second-order terms are given by
LWW = u22 + λTf44 LWY = u21 + λTf41
LY Y = u11 + λTf11 +
1
β
λTf22 + βλTf33 (5)
L"" = λTf55 LW" = λTf45 LY " = λTf15 (6)




λTf42 LY 1Y = λTf31 +
1
β





5Note that because of our assumption about no interaction between Yt+1 and Yt−1, it follows
that LY 1Y+1 = 0. Since it is expectation of the utility function that is to be maximized,
we can ignore LY 1" = 0 because E0Yt−1εt = 0. We shall also assume for convenience that
f52 = 0, so that the last term of (7) is zero; the state space setup derived below requires
a new variable which is equal to the shocks, so this is not an unreasonable requirement.
As we shall see below, the linearized state space setup of the dynamics at time t will
contain a linear combination of ∆Yt ≡ Yt − Yt−1, as well as a ∆Yt−1, but in order to
accommodate the lags in ∆Wt, as in (7), we need these in the state space as well.
From now on we shall express all linearized variables apart from the shocks as pro-
portional deviations from the steady state of the optimum e.g. yit = Yit− Yi
 Yi , and all
second-derivatives of the Lagrangian are transformed to correspond to this e.g. Lwy =
diag( ¯ W1,..., ¯ Wk)LWY diag(¯ Y1,..., ¯ Yn). An exception to this is when ¯ Yi = 0, in which case
we use deviations and not proportional deviations.
Suppose we write the linearized proportional deviation approximation of (1) as
A0yt+1;t + A1yt = A2yt−1 + B1wt + B2εt (8)
In general A0 will not be of full rank, and its rank could either be (a) less than the
number of forward-looking variables or (b) less than the number of equations in which a
forward-looking variable appears.
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where yt = V1xt + V2st. However because of the requirement for lags in the instruments
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t ]. Also note that yt−1 = [0 0 V2 V1 0]zt ≡ Γy 1zt and wt−1 =
[0 I 0 0 0]zt ≡ Γwzt and that εt = [I 0 0 0 0]zt ≡ Γ"zt.






t Wzzzt + wT
t Wwwwt + zT






y LyyΓy + ΓT
" L""Γ" + ΓT




y Lyw 1Γw + ΓT
y 1Ly 1yΓy + ΓT
y Lyy 1Γy 1 (12)
Www = Lww Wwz = LwyΓy + Lw"Γ" + Lwy 1Γy 1 (13)
3 From the Sims to the Blanchard-Kahn State Space Form
The aim of this section is to describe an algorithm for turning the state space setup (8) of
Dynare, into one that is suitable for obtaining the partial information setup that conforms
























We assume that the information set is expressed in linearized form as
mt = Lyt + vt (15)
where typically there is no observation error (vt = 0) and L picks out most of the economic
variables, typically excluding capital stock, Tobin’s q and shocks. However more generally
there is observation error, most notably when using historical data revisions.









(14) can then be used in conjunction with the welfare loss of the previous section to gener-
ate fully optimal, time consistent and optimized simple rules for both the full information
case using Currie and Levine (1993), and the case when agents have only partial informa-
tion of the form , using the results of Pearlman (1992). In addition, when estimating a
system with given rules, one can generate the likelihood function under partial information
(see below).
The algorithm proceeds as follows. For the moment deﬁne uT
t = [wT
t εT
t ], and B =
[B1 B2], so that we may write (8) as
A0yt+1;t + A1yt = A2yt−1 + But (17)
To repeat, all shocks ¯ mt to the system at time t are dated as though they were mt−1.
The procedure for conversion to a form suitable for ﬁltering is then as follows:
1. Obtain the singular value decomposition for matrix A0: A0 = UDV T, where U,V
are unitary matrices. Assuming that only the ﬁrst m values of the diagonal matrix
D are non-zero, we can rewrite this as A0 = U1D1V T
1 , where U1 are the ﬁrst m
columns of U, D1 is the ﬁrst m × m block of D and V T
1 are the ﬁrst m rows of V T.
2. Multiply (17) by D−1
1 UT
1 , which yields
V T
1 yt+1;t + D−1
1 UT
1 A1yt = D−1
1 UT
1 A2yt−1 + D−1
1 UT
1 But (18)
Now deﬁne xt = V T
1 yt, st = V T
2 yt, and use the fact that I = V V T = V1V T
1 + V2V T
2
to rewrite this as:
xt+1;t + D−1
1 UT
1 A1(V1xt + V2st) = D−1
1 UT
1 A2(V1xt−1 + V2st−1) + D−1
1 UT
1 But (19)
3. Multiply (17) by UT
2 which yields
UT
2 A1yt = UT
2 A2yt−1 + UT
2 But (20)
which can be rewritten as
UT
2 A1(V1xt + V2st) = UT
2 A2(V1xt−1 + V2st−1) + UT
2 But (21)
4. Suppose that UT
2 A1V2 is not invertible. We then need a more sophisticated approach,
which reduces the dimension of the forward-looking variables (and increases the
dimension of the backward-looking variables), and which may require a loop:
8(a) For convenience, rewrite (19) and (21) as
xt+1;t + F1xt + F2st = F3xt−1 + F4st−1 + F5ut (22)
C1xt + C2st = C3xt−1 + C4st−1 + C5ut (23)
and obtain the SVD C2 = J1K1LT
1 .
(b) Multiply (23) through by JT
2 where J2 is orthogonal to J1 to yield
JT
2 C1xt = JT
2 C3xt−1 + JT
2 C4st−1 + JT
2 C5ut (24)
Note that the vector st will be augmented by JT
2 C1xt
(c) Find a matrix M that has the same number of columns as JT
2 C1 and is made
up of rows that are orthogonal to JT


















Now shift (24) one period forward and take expectations; the expectation
Etεt+1 = 0 automatically, but if any of the coeﬃcients in JT
2 C5 correspond-
ing to Etwt+1 are non-zero, record an error - this will be sorted out at a much
later stage. Then equate this to the product of (22) by JT
2 C1 which yields
JT
2 C3xt + JT
2 C4st = JT






2 C1F2)st = JT
2 C1(F3xt−1+F4st−1+F5ut) (27)
(d) Thus we can rewrite the system (22), (23) in terms of forward-looking variables
¯ xt and backward-looking variables st, ˆ xt:





















2 (C4 + C1F2) JT





























9(e) Thus the number of forward-looking states has decreased because ¯ xt = M1xt,





has increased by the
same amount. In addition the relationship yt = V1xt + V2st has changed to






(f) We then re-deﬁne the matrices C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,F1,F2,F3,F4,F5 accordingly,
and check whether C2 is invertible. If not, then go back to (a); otherwise
continue.
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6. The measurements mt = Lyt + vt can be written in terms of the states as mt =
L(V1xt + V2st) + vt. To write the system in a form which corresponds to that of
Pearlman et al. (1986) we need to write the measurements in terms of the forward-
looking variables xt and in terms of the backward-looking variables st−1, xt−1. We
do this by substituting for st from (32); but this introduces a term in ut into the
expression, and Pearlman et al. (1986) assume that shock terms in the dynamics
and in the measurements are uncorrelated with one another. To remedy this, we
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and the vector of jump variables given by xt. Note that there is an issue not covered by
Pearlman (1992), namely that the instrument wt is part of the measurement equation;
if we assume that the instruments are observed, then there is no problem to modify the
theory.
Note that this means that the relationship between the underlying variables yt and the

























V2P1 V2G11 V2G12 V1 − V2G13 V2N1
0 0 0 0 I
]
(36)
4 Impulse Response Functions
We distinguish between two cases: agents having full information, and agents having
partial information mt at time t. Assume that the system (14) contains no instruments
and is already saddlepath stable, so that D1 = 0,D2 = 0, and that the relationship (36)
can be written as yt = Γ1zt + Γ2xt.
4.1 Full Information Case:
It is well-known that the impulse response functions can be generated from














and ΛU is a square matrix with unstable eigenvalues equal to those of the system.
4.2 Partial Information Case:
The reduced-form solution, that can be used to generate the impulse response functions
is then given by:
System : zt+1 = Fzt + (A − F)˜ zt
+(F − A)PHT(HPHT + V )−1(H˜ zt + vt) + Cεt+1 (39)
xt = −Nzt + (N − A−1
22 A21)˜ zt
−(N − A−1
22 A21)PHT(HPHT + V )−1(H˜ zt + vt) (40)
Innovations : ˜ zt+1 = A˜ zt − APHT(HPHT + V )−1(H˜ zt + vt) + Cεt+1 (41)
Measurement : mt = Ezt + (H − E)˜ zt + vt
−(H − E)PHT(HPHT + V )−1(H˜ zt + vt)
= Ezt;t−1 + (EPHT + V )(HPHT + V )−1(H˜ zt + vt) (42)
V ariables : yt = Γ1zt + Γ2xt (43)
where F = A11−A12N A = A11−A12A−1
22 A21 E = K1−K2N H = K1−K2A−1
22 A21
V is the covariance matrix of the measurement errors, and P is the solution of the Riccati
equation given by
P = APAT − APHT(HPHT + V )−1HPAT + CUCT (44)
and U is the covariance matrix of the shocks to the system.
5 Covariances and Autocovariances













M = FMFT + FPHT(HPHT + V )−1HPFT (46)
To calculate the covariances and autocovariances of yt, we note from the previous section
that yt can also be written as yt = V1xt+V2st, and that the last bottom part of the vector
12zt is given by [sT
t−1 xT
t−1]T, of dimension n, say. Then deﬁning Ω0 as the bottom right
n × n matrix of (P + M), it follows that








To calculate the autocovariances, deﬁne
Φ =
[
A(I − PHT(HPHT + V )−1H) 0
(A − F)(I − PHT(HPHT + V )−1H) F
]
(48)











≡ Pk = ΦkP0 = ΦPk−1 (49)
Deﬁning Ωk as the bottom right n × n matrix of Pk, it follows that
cov(yt+k,yt) = E(yt+kyT
















2. the correlation matrix of the yt variables is deﬁned as







6 Calculation of the Likelihood Function
Once again we assume that there are no policy instruments wt and that the system is
saddlepath stable. In addition we assume that agents have the same information set as
the econometrician.
From the perspective of the econometrician, who starts out with no information other
than the structure of the system, the reduced form is given by (39) and (42), with covari-
ance matrices as calculated above. In order to reduce the amount of notation, we assume
that the measurement errors are incorporated into the shocks so that the vector εt+1 is
augmented by vt+1. After some algebraic manipulation it can be shown that the optimal
estimate of ˜ zt using information up to t − 1 is equal to 0, from which it follows that the
Kalman ﬁltering equation for zt is given by
zt+1;t = Fzt;t−1 + FZtET(EZtET)−1et (52)
13where et = mt − Ezt;t−1 and
Zt+1 = FZtFT + PHT(HPHT)−1HP − FZtET(EZtET)−1EZtFT (53)
the latter being a time-dependent Ricatti equation.








cov(et) = EZtET (55)
The system is initialised at z1;0 = 0, and Z1 is initialised by the solution of the
Lyapunov equation
Z1 = FZ1FT + PHT(HPHT)−1HP (56)
where P is the steady state of the Riccati equation above.
7 Controllable and Observable Forms
For the calculation of optimal policy based on the linearized version of the nonlinear
dynamics, there are two numerical problems. Firstly, if for example one is studying a
small open economy then there will be a part of the model (without an exogenous instru-
ment) describing the large economy that typically involves forward looking variables. This
will therefore have unstable eigenvalues that the period-doubling solution for the Riccati
equation cannot handle - this is the controllability problem. Secondly, the linearization
of the New Keynesian Phillips curve at an inﬂation level of 0 generates a set of at least
two dynamic equations that can be collapsed into just one (see Appendix for example);
the number of variables needs to be collapsed down as well, otherwise this also generates
problems with the period-doubling solution - this is the observability problem.


















Suppose that the system is not controllable, so that there exist eigenvalues λ and eigen-
vectors mT such that
mTA = λmT mTB = 0 mTD = 0 (58)
14This implies that mTxt+1 = λmTxt i.e. mTxt evolves independently of any instruments
or shocks.
If this were a backward-looking system, then the following algorithm is appropriate:
Deﬁne matrix T and its inverse, so that it is made up of mT and a set of row vectors

































































so the reduced form is
Fxt+1 = FA ˆ F(Fxt) + FBwt yt = Γ ˆ F(Fxt) (62)
Thus the system is now written in terms of Fxt.
However for RE systems one has to proceed with more care. Firstly, if mT contains
non-zero elements corresponding to both forward and backward-looking variables, then
this will imply a potential saddlepath relationship whether or not mTB = 0, provided
that the eigenvalue λ has modulus greater than 1. Secondly, if mTB = 0, then one one only
reduces the system if all the the non-zero elements of mT correspond only to backward or
only to forward-looking variables.
Thus the program proceeds as follows:
1. Find λ,mT. If mTD ̸= 0 do nothing, but if mTD = 0 then
• if mT contains non-zero elements corresponding to both forward and backward
variables and |λ| > 1, proceed to 2; reduce the number of FL variables by 1.
Otherwise do nothing
• if mT contains non-zero elements corresponding to only forward or only back-
ward variables and mTB = 0, proceed to 2; reduce either the number of FL or
the number of BL variables by 1 accordingly. Otherwise do nothing.
2. Choose F to create T as in (60); ﬁnd T−1 and hence ˆ F
3. Calculate FA ˆ F,FB,Γ ˆ F, and record whether the dimension of forward or backward
looking variables is reduced.
Remark: Typically all the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the non-controllable states
will be grouped together in one sweep, rather than dealt with one by one.
157.2 Observable Form
Suppose there are eigenvalues µ and eigenvectors s such that
Γs = 0 As = µs (63)
Now deﬁne matrix T and its inverse, so that it is made up of s and a set of column vectors








































































yt = ΓG(Hxt) (66)
The dynamics of vTxt then play no role in the measurement yt, so we can rewrite this in
reduced form as
Hxt+1 = HAG(Hxt) + HBwt yt = ΓG(Hxt) (67)
Thus the system is now written in terms of Hxt.
To program this, we proceed as follows:
• Find µ,s. Select an s that contains only non-zero entries corresponding to backward-
looking variables or only forward-looking variables.
• Choose G to create T as in (65); ﬁnd T−1 and hence H.
• Calculate HAG,HB,ΓG, and record whether the dimension of forward or backward
looking variables is reduced.
• If the only s that are left contain non-zero elements in the positions of both FL and
BL variables, record as error and exit.
8 Optimal Policy and the Zero Lower Bound
Details of optimal policy for the full information case can be viewed in Currie and Levine
(1993) and for the partial information case are in Pearlman (1992), so are not detailed here.
Three types of optimal policy are studied - fully optimal, time-consistent and optimized
16simple rules. If the variances of shocks are suﬃciently large, this will lead to a large
nominal interest rate variability and the possibility of the nominal interest rate becoming
negative.
To rule out this possibility but remain within the tractable LQ framework, we follow
Woodford (2003), chapter 6, and modify our interest-rate rules to approximately impose an
interest rate ZLB so that this event hardly ever occurs. Write the quadratic approximation
to the single-period loss function can be written as Lt. As in Woodford (2003), chapter 6,
the ZLB constraint is implemented by modifying the single period welfare loss to Lt+wrr2
t.
Then following Levine et al. (2008b), the policymaker’s optimization problem is to
choose wr and the unconditional distribution for Rt (characterized by the steady state
variance) shifted to the right about a new non-zero steady state inﬂation rate and a
higher nominal interest rate, such that the probability, p, of the interest rate hitting the
lower bound is very low. This is implemented by calibrating the weight wr diﬀerent for
each policy rule - fully optimal (OPT), time-consistent (TCT) or optimized simple (SIM)
so that z0(p)σr < Rn where z0(p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed
variable Z such that prob (Z ≤ z0) = p, R∗
n = (1+π∗)R+π∗ is the steady state nominal
interest rate, R is the steady state real interest rate, σ2
r = var(Rn) is the unconditional
variance and π∗ is the new steady state inﬂation rate. Given σr the steady state positive








In our linear-quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected welfare
loss at time t = 0 as the sum of stochastic and deterministic components, Ω0 = ˜ Ω0 + ¯ Ω0.
Note that ¯ Ω0 incorporates in principle the new steady state values of all the variables;
however the NK Phillips curve being almost vertical, the main extra term comes from
a contribution from (π∗)2. By increasing wr we can lower σr thereby decreasing π∗ and
reducing the deterministic component, but at the expense of increasing the stochastic
component of the welfare loss. By exploiting this trade-oﬀ, we then arrive at the optimal
policy that, in the vicinity of the steady state, imposes the ZLB constraint, rt ≥ 0 with
probability 1 − p.
Note that in our LQ framework, the zero interest rate bound is very occasionally
hit. Then interest rate is allowed to become negative, possibly using a scheme proposed
by Gesell (1934) and Keynes (1936). Our approach to the ZLB constraint (following
Woodford (2003))4 in eﬀect replaces it with a nominal interest rate variability constraint
which ensures the ZLB is hardly ever hit. By contrast the work of a number of authors
4We generalize the treatment of Woodford however by allowing the steady-state inﬂation rate to rise.
Our policy prescription has recently been described as a dual mandate in which a central bank committed
to a long-run inﬂation objective suﬃciently high to avoid the ZLB constraint as well as a Taylor-type policy
stabilization rule about such a rate - see Blanchard et al. (2010) and Gavin and Keen (2011).
17including Adam and Billi (2007), Coenen and Wieland (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) and Eggertsson (2006) study optimal monetary policy with commitment in the face
of a non-linear constraint it ≥ 0 which allows for frequent episodes of liquidity traps in
the form of it = 0.
A problem with the procedure described so far is that it shifts the steady state to
a new one with a higher inﬂation, but continues to approximate the loss function and
the dynamics about the original Ramsey steady state. We know from the work of Ascari
and Ropele (2007a) and Ascari and Ropele (2007b) that the dynamic properties of the
linearized model change signiﬁcantly when the model is linearized about a non-zero inﬂa-
tion. This issue is addressed analytically in Coibion et al. (2011), but in a very simple NK
model. We now propose a general solution and numerical procedure that can be used in
any DSGE model.
1. Set up the Non-Linear Model in Dynare. Deﬁne a new parameter: p, the probability
of hitting the ZLB, the weight wr on the variance of the nominal net interest rate
and a target steady state nominal interest rate ˆ Rn.
2. Modify the single-period utility to Lt = Λt − 1
2wr(Rn;t − ˆ Rn)2.
3. In the ﬁrst iteration let wr to be low to get through OPT, say wr = 0.001 and ˆ Rn =
1
 −1, the no-growth zero-inﬂation steady-state nominal interest rate corresponding
to the standard Ramsey problem with no ZLB considerations.
4. Perform the LQ approximation of the Ramsey optimization problem with modiﬁed
loss function Lt. For standard problems the steady state nominal net inﬂation rate
πRamsey = 0 and R
Ramsey
n = 1




5. Compute OPT or TCT or optimized simple rule SIM in Dynare-ACES
6. Extract σr = σr(wr).
7. Extract the minimized conditional (in the vicinity of the steady state, i.e. z0 = 0 in
ACES) stochastic loss function ˜ Ω0(wr)
8. Compute r∗
n = r∗








in the ﬁrst iteration R
Ramsey
n = 1
 − 1 as noted above. This ensures that the ZLB is
reached with a low probability p.
9. If r∗
n < 0, the ZLB constraint is not binding; if rn∗ > 0 it is. Proceed in either case.
10. Deﬁne π∗ = πRamsey + r∗
n.
11. Compute the steady state ¯ Ω0(π∗) at the steady state of the model with a shifted
new inﬂation rate π∗. Then compute ∆¯ Ω0(r∗(wr)) ≡ ¯ Ω0(π∗) − ¯ Ω0(πRamsey)
1812. Compute the actual total stochastic plus deterministic loss function that hits the
ZLB with a low probability p
Ω0(wr) = ˜ Ωactual
0 (wr) + ∆¯ Ω0(r∗(wr)) (69)
13. A good approximation for ˜ Ω0(wr)actual is ˜ Ω0(wr)actual ≃ ˜ Ω0(wr) − 1
2wrσ2
r provided
the welfare loss is multiplied by 1 − β.
14. Finally minimize Ω0(wr) with respect to wr. This imposes the ZLB constraint as in
Figure 1.
15. What now changes is to reset ˆ Rn = 1
 − 1 + απ∗ where α ∈ (0,1] is a relaxation pa-
rameter to experiment with, i.e., ( ˆ Rn)new = RRamsey;old +r∗
n, wnew
r = argminΩ0(wr)
and return to the beginning. Iterate until ˆ Rn and wr are unchanged.
9 Conclusions
We have provided novel algorithms for writing RE models in Blanchard-Kahn form,
thereby enabling standard methods to be used for computing optimal policy, impulse
response functions and second moments. We have also demonstrated how standard meth-
ods for controllability and observability need to be tailored for RE models. Finally we
have described an algorithm with good convergence properties for computing policies -
fully optimal, time consistent and optimized simple - that satisfy the ZLB for nominal
interest rates.
Appendix
A Example of Non-observable Form
Consider the part of the NK Phillips Curve in non-linear form:
Ht − ξβEt[Π
−1



















ht − ξβ((ζ − 1)πt+1 + ht+1) = (1 − ξβ)(1 − σ)yt (73)
jt − ξβ(ζπt+1 + jt+1) = (1 − ξβ)(1 + ϕ)(yt − at) (74)
19Multiply (73) by ζ and (74) by ζ − 1 and subtract, which gives
ζht−(ζ−1)jt−ξβ(ζht+1−(ζ−1)jt+1) = (1−ξβ)[ζ(1−σ)yt+(ζ−1)(1+ϕ)(yt−at)] (75)
This is an equation in ζht − (ζ − 1)jt which is controllable, but which is not observable.
Only πt =
1−
 (jt − ht) is observable.
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